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Good Faith in English Law, J F O'Connor, Faculty of Law, University 
College Cork, Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, Aldershot, 1990, 
148 pages (including tables and index) ISBN 1 85521 017 7. 
'Good faith' is a term often used but rarely defined or analysed with care. 
In this short volume O'Connor has undertaken a formidable task: the 
development of a general principle of good faith that is applicable 
throughout English law. He begins with a proposed definition and then 
proceeds through brief analyses of the good faith concept in six areas of 
the law (administrative law, contracts, company law, criminal law, torts, 
trusts and property). He makes a quick excursion across the Channel to 
consider the civil law approach to the principle of good faith and then 
concludes with a chapter devoted to the synthesis of the cases considered 
in the book and to a re-examination of his proposed definition. 
The discussion of the development of equitable principles which 
underlie the doctrine of good faith (ch 1, pp 1-10) is interesting, but 
cursory. That story has been told at length elsewhere, but it does provide 
a necessary introduction to O'Connor's work. O'Connor addresses what 
appears to be his overall goal early in the book when he goes about 
defining a general principle of good faith. He makes two assumptions 
(ch 1, p 11). The first is that any definitions of good faith must include the 
rule of pacta sunt servanda from contract law and include elements of 
'honesty, fairness, and reasonableness'. The second 'is that a large part of 
the "normal" rules of any legal system will reflect the substantive ethical 
content of good faith'. On the basis of these assumptions, he goes on to 
attempt a general definition of good faith (p 11): 
The principle of good faith in English law is a fundamental principle derived 
from the rule pacta sunt servanda and other legal rules distinctively and 
directly related to honesty, fairness and reasonableness, which supplements or 
supersedes normally applicable rules when this is necessary to ensure that the 
standards of honesty, fairness and reasonableness which prevail in the 
community also prevail in English law. 
The six chapters which follow and which test the definition in various 
substantive areas are too brief to offer more than a telegraphic form of 
coverage. Moreover, they involve topics so disparate that a proper 
comparative analysis would require treatment in substantially greater 
detail. On p 64, for example, O'Connor concludes that the 'normal rules 
of criminal law, and the basic presumption of mens rea reflect the 
substance of good faith'. That is no doubt true, but is hardly more than 
a truism. The conclusion does not relate in any meaningful way to the 
complex interconnections in contract law among pacta sunt servanda, 
freedom of contract, the doctrine of efficient breach, and excuses for 
non-performance such as unconscionability and commercial 
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impracticability. (See, for example, Uniform Commercial Code ss 2-302 
and 2-615). This leaves the reader with little that ties the chapters 
together other than vague references to concepts of honesty, 
reasonableness and fair dealing. 
Space constraints on this review prevent a careful parsing of each 
chapter, and, in any event, this reviewer is far from being an expert on 
several of the substantive areas. However, a review of ch 3 on good faith 
in contract law does give pause. The author notes the importance of good 
faith in the Uniform Commercial Code of the United States, but provides 
virtually no discussion of the extensive common law development of 
the concept outside the code since the decision by Judge Cardozo in 
Wood v Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon.1 Similarly, the author's discussion of 
unconscionability in s 2-302 of the UCC overlooks the often confusing, 
but extensive use of the concept by American courts for generations.2 
The author is correct in noting that there has been increased interest in 
the concept of good faith in contract law among American judges and 
legislators,3 but he fails to consider the parallel rise of interest in the 
concept of efficient breach,4 the continuing vitality of the concept of 
freedom of contract,5 and the importance of relationships, especially in 
long term agreements.6 
In the concluding ch 9, p 99-102, the author tries to draw together the 
various strands of good faith from the authorities he has reviewed to test 
the validity of the definition he put forth at the outset. His conclusion is 
significantly different from his original proposal. The changes are 
italicised (ch 9, p 102); 
The principle of good faith in English law is a fundamental principle derived 
from the rule pacta sunt servanda, and other legal rules, distinctively and 
directly related to honesty, fairness, and reasonableness, the application of 
which is determined at a particular time by the standards of honesty, fairness and 
reasonableness prevailing in the community which are considered appropriate for 
formulation in new or revised legal rules. 
This definition may be an accurate reflection of the cases reviewed by 
the author, but, if so, it is not a prescriptive rule but simply a statement 
that 'good faith' is whatever happens to be currently acceptable 
behaviour in the 'community'. Which 'community' is important. For 
example, Karl Llewellyn, the principal draftsman of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, wanted to have questions of reasonableness, trade 
practice, and so forth under Art 2 of the UCC decided by juries of 
1 222 NY 88, 118 NE 214 (1917). There is also the long development of reliance and 
promissory estoppel as alternative justifications for the enforcement of promises. See 
eg P S Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, 1979. 
2 See eg Williams v Walker-Thomas Furniture Co 350 F 2d 445 (DC Cir 1965). 
3 For a commentator's argument in favor of the sanctity of promise as a moral duty see 
C Fried, Contract as Promise, 1981. 
4 See eg C J Goetz and R E Scott, 'Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of 
Contract' (1980) 89 Yale LJ 1261; Symposium, 'Economics of Contract Law', (1989) 
52 Law & Contemp Probs 1. 
5 See eg R E Barnett, 'A Consent Theory of Contract', (1986) 86 Colum L Rev 269. 
6 See eg C J Goetz and R E Scott, 'Principles of Relational Contracts' (1981) 67 Va 
L Rev 1089. 
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merchants, the business world peers of those most affected by the 
provisions on sales.7 He was unsuccessful, and lay jurors or judges today 
decide such issues in American courts. This expands the 'community' to 
the larger society at the expense of predictability and stability among the 
smaller universe of merchants and makes merchants subject to more 
generalised standards of behaviour. 
Whether one uses a larger universe of jurors or a smaller universe 
drawn from a particular economic group, the result remains similar: 
the 'oughts' suggested by terms such as 'fair dealing,' 'honesty', 
'reasonableness' and 'good faith' are defined by reference to 'what is' 
rather than by reference to a norm.8 The broader the community the 
more likely that 'what is' acceptable behaviour will have a generalised 
appeal. (One can imagine the problems created by a definition of good 
faith that is dependent on what is acceptable among a community of 
criminals.) At the same time a broader community is less likely to agree 
upon a specific standard of good faith that is applicable in a given case. 
(How many times must a prospective buyer apply for a loan when closing 
is conditioned on a successful loan application by the buyer?) 
A rough approximation of what most people consider to be ethical 
behaviour might be derived from a careful consideration of socially 
acceptable behavior, but even under the most generous reading, 
O'Connor's conclusion can never be more than descriptive and fluid. 
That may be the best we can do from an analysis of current case law, but 
it is not a satisfactory result if the goal is to establish a normative 
definition of universal legal applicability.9 
HOWARD O HUNTER 
7 Note, 'Commercial Law and the American Volk: A Note on Llewellyn's German 
Sources for the Uniform Commercial Code', (1987) 97 Yale LJ 156. 
8 Students of philosophy should be aware of the 'naturalistic fallacy' which is the 
attempt to define 'what ought to be by reference to what is'. See G E Moore, Principia 
Ethica, 1971 ed, pp 10-14, discussed in C J Goetz and R E Scott, Sales Law and the 
Contracting Process, 2nd ed, 1991, p 18. 
9 See generally on a similar topic R Danzig, 'A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the 
Uniform Commercial Code', (1975) 27 Stan L Rev 621. 
